Commentary on Hughes by Abbott, William
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 2
May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PM
Commentary on Hughes
William Abbott
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has
been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
William Abbott, "Commentary on Hughes" (May 15, 1997). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 59.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA2/papersandcommentaries/59
HUGHES ON ETHICS AND CRITICAL THINKING
William Abbott
Department of Philosophy
University of Waterloo
©1998, William Abbott
 
William Hughes makes several points, among which are:
1)Moral scepticism can be answered.
2)It is morally preferable to include moral reasoning in critical thinking courses.
3)Two particular forms of moral reasoning are rationally respectable.
4)These forms of reasoning are particular to moral debate.
Along the way Hughes claims that moral reasoning is inadequately represented in textbooks on critical thinking.
My brief and rather haphazard survey of critical thinking texts does not support his claim, but that is not
important. After all, I found several which entirely omit specifically moral arguments, and that is enough for
Hughes's case.
I concede Hughes's point 2) above, that it is morally preferable to include moral reasoning in critical thinking
courses, but am concerned to deal with his arguments for the position. I start with the point that moral scepticism
can be answered. It seems to me that Hughes could have distinguished between two forms of scepticism, one
which he finds among students and which he suspects is to be found among the authors, the other which he
discusses without attributing it to anyone.
The first form of scepticism is positivist in tone—science allows public resolution and deals with the factual, while
morals (values?) cannot be resolved by public procedures. The second form rejects moral reasoning because its
conclusions lack certainty. Maybe the first can be called Positivist scepticism and the second Demonstrative
scepticism. I think that Hughes could strengthen his position by distinguishing between the two.
Positivist scepticism. Hughes observes that this position can be answered by reference to the ways in which the
two types of moral reasoning permit ongoing, public debate that leads to applying socially approved standards to
the discussion. Historically, the movement away from emotivism took a line somewhat like this position. The
analysis of rules of moral discourse, gradually replaced the simple-minded accounts of the early emotivists, which
in effect disappeared as people examined debates more closely. So far, so good. But I wonder why Hughes
does not also build on developments in the philosophy of science to show that science is not nearly so cut and
dried as this scepticism requires. Much philosophy of science has shown that scientific theory construction and
theory choice is not a simple matter of meeting the facts. In considering theory choices and in theory preferences
we see how scientific claims can require long periods of discussion and debate. Once we see the extent to which
debate and differing values can affect our conceptions of correct theory, the sharpness of the differences
between simple fact and questionable value can be dulled. Without denying that there are differences, we can see
that ongoing public debate is central to both.
Demonstrative scepticism. As Hughes himself notes, since virtually nobody holds that absolute certainty is
achieved in typical empirical enquiries, it is hard to see how lack of certainty is a special objection to moral
reasoning. And certainly a few examples of immoral behaviour could show that we are in practice confident
enough of our judgements about many moral matters. And that it seems to me is enough for this kind of
scepticism. In fact, it seems almost enough to observe that we are more nearly certain that killings in Rwanda are
bad than we are that the universe is five billion years old.
Turning from answering scepticism, I wonder about point 4) that these forms of argument are sufficiently
exclusive to moral reasoning.
Do these two forms of scepticism require special attention?
As Devil's Advocate, I ask whether we need moral reasoning to counteract these two forms of scepticism, since
both would be eliminated by close reference to the status of scientific theories and empirical investigations. Why
not simply make it clear that certainty cannot be expected in most of our very important concerns, and that
constant debate and ongoing re-examination of the best way to treat available evidence are the hallmarks of the
scientific spirit and free society? In taking this line, I would ask why the reference to Hughes's first form of moral
reasoning, consequential reasoning is different from general economic or prudential or strategic reasoning. As for
his second form of moral reasoning, the "appeal to right and wrong", we have here concepts of consistency,
which of course need to be separated from cases of illicit ad hominem. The case of Mary, who is asked for the
maxim on which she is acting, is not in general unlike asking people for the more general principles on which they
are staking their positions, whether in support of their favourite social policies or their reasons accepting a theory
as to why their new printer messes up their e-mail. In all such cases we want the reasoner to show that the
principles used in the particular instance are also principles that the speaker can defend in the general case. And
these are different from ad hominem in that the issue is whether the present case is being dealt with by a
defensible principle.
I suggest, as Devil's Advocate that proper treatment of scientific and empirical matters would so undermine these
two forms of scepticism, that we need not address them except in passing, and that attention to typical forms of
argument, including prudential or strategic arguments on the one hand and consistency of principle arguments on
the other, would make it unnecessary to pay special attention to moral arguments.
Deep silliness. I note that Hughes finds yet another form of moral scepticism and a curious one at that. It holds
that value judgements are best understood as weapons, and that self-identity is attacked by attacking someone's
values. I am less inclined than Hughes to find anything of value here. Maybe we need to re-introduce some of the
trial of Socrates to such students. I recall many years ago that students were quite complacent about killing
Socrates on the grounds that he was a trouble maker, asked unpopular questions, and upset people by
challenging their values. At the time I thought of this position as simple stupid nasty bigotry, and I confess I have
trouble dissociating myself from that opinion. It seems clear that this last form of scepticism is little more than the
justification for getting rid of Socrates and his ilk. I wonder whether we could not get these people to see that
their view would let Socrates keep his own values of criticizing the values of others, since that is part of his
identity, and at the same time try to prevent him from doing so, since he would be depriving them of their values.
But I am not at all sure how much success one can have with the views in question.
In my capacity as Devil's Advocate I have asked whether it would not be effective to distinguish the forms of
scepticism and answer each on its own terms, and then, once that is done, whether it is true that moral reasoning
is all that distinct from other forms of reasoning. I agree with Hughes's conclusion that we are better off to include
moral reasoning in critical thinking courses, but am not sure that Hughes's way actually proves his case.
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